Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents
- 1 January 2010
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimatKeywords
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