Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- 1 December 1989
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 49 (2) , 294-313
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90083-5
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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