Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports
- 1 February 2000
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Sports Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 56-65
- https://doi.org/10.1177/152700250000100105
Abstract
The aim of this article is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a revenue sharing arrangement on the competitive balance in a sports league. A crucial factor in the discussion seems to be the impact of the absolute rather than the relative quality of the teams on the clubs' revenues. The analysis shows that revenue sharing improves the competitive balance under both the profit- and the utility-maximizing hypotheses.Keywords
All Related Versions
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