A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice
- 1 December 1979
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 73 (4) , 1055-1070
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1953989
Abstract
This article develops a simultaneous equation model of the voting decision in a form thought to mirror the main lines of cognitive decision-making processes of individual voters. The model goes beyond earlier efforts in two respects. First, it explicitly represents the causal interdependence of voter assessments in the election situation, permitting such estimations as the degree to which correlations between voter issue positions and issue positions ascribed to preferred candidates arise because of projection onto the candidate or persuasion by the candidate. Secondly, the model is truly dynamic, in the sense that it is dependent on longitudinal data for its proper estimation. The utility of the model is certified by the goodness of fit achieved when applied to 1972–76 panel data for a sample of the national electorate.Keywords
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