Applicability of the big lie technique and the last clear chance doctrine to bargaining.

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Abstract
Studied bargaining via written offers between each of 180 female undergraduates and an accomplice over the division of a hypothetical $90. Profit was determined by the difference between one's share of the negotiated agreement and one's break-even point. Break-even points were drawn from a box, with s always drawing $30 and being ignorant of the accomplice's break-even point. Statements about one's break-even point were optional and could be lies. The design was a 3 * 2 * 2 factorial design with the factors being (a) extremity of break-even point statements by the accomplice $30, $40, or $50; (b) frequency with the accomplice stated her break-even point 1 in 10 offers or 3 in 10 offers; and (c) bargaining order s went 1st or last on all 20 rounds. The more extreme the accomplice's statement, the more favorable to the accomplice the s's last offer, the more often s agreed to the accomplice's demands, and the fewer the number of offers in the bargaining. The frequency of statements had no effect. In those sessions lasting the full 20 rounds, s yielded more often when going last rather than 1st. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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