Cognitive-experiential self-theory and subjective probability: Further evidence for two conceptual systems.

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Abstract
Three experiments (N = 1,331) demonstrated that research findings on suspiciousness about coincidences (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989) can be accounted for in terms of subjective probability, as predicted by cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) but in contrast with the norm theory (NT) account offered by Miller et al. (1989). Ss participated in a hypothetical (Experiments 1 and 2) or real (Experiment 3) lottery game in which they chose between 2 bowls offering equivalent probabilities of winning or losing but differing with respect to absolute numbers (e.g., 1 in 10 vs. 10 in 100). Responses across 4 conditions (2 probability levels x 2 outcome types) and across the 3 experiments supported predictions derived from CEST but not those derived from NT. Results are discussed in terms of 2 conceptual systems, rational and experiential, that operate by different rules of inference.

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