Information, Returns, and Bidding Behavior in OCS Auctions: 1954-1969

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Abstract
This paper examines federal auctions for leases on the Outer Continental Shelf in the light of the predictions of the first-price, sealed-bid, common-values model of auctions. The authors find that the data strongly support the model for auctions in which one bidder is better informed than the other bidders. The evidence for auctions in which bidders have noisy, but qualitatively similar, information is less conclusive but is consistent with a model in which each bidder does not know either the actual or potential number of bidders on a lease. Copyright 1987 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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