Consent.
- 14 December 1985
- Vol. 291 (6510) , 1700-1701
- https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.291.6510.1700
Abstract
Gillon contends that consent to medical intervention is by definition informed consent because it requires action by an autonomous agent based on adequate information. Doctors often object that patients are unnecessarily alarmed by too much information about their illnesses or proposed treatments, but many patients are happier if they are told enough to be active in decision making about their care. In any case, the moral obligation to respect the autonomy of other persons requires that patients be given as much information as they want. Even English law, which heretofore left to the doctor the decision on how much information to disclose, has been changed considerably by the House of Lords' appeal judgement in Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital. The general moral presumption regarding consent should be that patient autonomy takes priority over medical beneficence. Exceptions to this presumption are to be discussed by the author in another article.Keywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
- Medical negligence: who sets the standard?Journal of Medical Ethics, 1985
- Consent, competency and ECT: a psychiatrist's viewJournal of Medical Ethics, 1983
- Informed consent: what does it mean?Journal of Medical Ethics, 1983
- ArroganceNew England Journal of Medicine, 1980
- Informed consent--a legal evaluation.1980
- Informed consent—a legal evaluationCancer, 1980
- Case Studies in Medical EthicsThe Antioch Review, 1977
- ‘Informed Consent’ to Medical ProceduresMedicine, Science and the Law, 1975
- 'Informed consent' to medical procedures.1975