A two-player game model of power cogeneration in New England
- 1 January 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 37 (9) , 1451-1456
- https://doi.org/10.1109/9.159591
Abstract
The interaction between a utility company and electricity cogenerators is modeled via a game theoretic, systems analysis approach, under the assumption of asymmetric pricing of electricity purchased or sold by the cogenerators. The pricing scheme is derived from the PURPA legislation prevailing in the United States, and is compared to an efficient operation of the global system. An adaptation or a successive approximation algorithm is developed and applied to the case of New England. The results are presented for three scenarios which simulate the status quo, the PURPA situation, and the ideal cooperative optimum.This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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