Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes
- 1 October 2000
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 108 (5) , 1006-1021
- https://doi.org/10.1086/317677
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- Contingent Fees and Agency CostsThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1996
- Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is PossibleThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1996
- The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff VictoryJournal of Political Economy, 1995
- Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic AnalysisThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- Uncertainty, information and resolution of medical malpractice disputesJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1991
- Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization EstimatorsEconometrica, 1989
- Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical ApproachThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1989
- Credible Pretrial NegotiationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1987
- Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice ClaimsThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1983
- Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments EstimatorsEconometrica, 1982