Regime Change

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Abstract
This article examines two plausible rival explanations of regime change. The first explanation, a structuralist argument, holds that regimes change because they are not constructed properly. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the coherence in authority relations (that is, consistently democratic or consistently autocratic features) of a polity is a necessary condition for the lengthy persistence of that polity. The second explanation, a functionalist argument, holds that regimes change because they do not perform properly. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the cumulation of performance crises (that is, any combination of high mass illegitimacy, high mass strife, and low decisional efficacy) of a polity is a sufficient condition for its quick demise. These two rival explanations of regime change are not mutually exclusive. Hence, we attempt a synthesis of the structuralist and functionalist arguments by suggesting two further hypotheses: that the coherence in authority relations and noncumulation of performance crises in a polity are necessary and sufficient conditions for the lengthy persistence of that polity; and, that the incoherence in authority relations and cumulation of performance crises in a polity are necessary and sufficient conditions for the quick demise of that polity. Evidence gathered from 25 polities provides striking confirmation of all four hypotheses.

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