Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
- 1 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 37 (1) , 40-78
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0827
Abstract
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This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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