Contract design and costly verification games
- 1 February 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 34 (2) , 327-340
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00055-3
Abstract
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