Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments
- 31 July 1982
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 3 (1) , 9-32
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90003-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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