Bargaining Set Theory and Majority Rule
- 1 September 1976
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 20 (3) , 481-496
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277602000305
Abstract
The kernel and the bargaining set are employed as predictors of experimental trials for four and five person simple majority rule games. Both concepts are found to be good predictors of game outcomes. A comparison is made between the bargaining set concepts and the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution sets which demonstrates that bargaining theory is the better predictor. The authors statistically manipulated experimental control variables to make point predictions in the kernel.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- The majority rule gameInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule GameJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1974
- Bargaining in a Three-Person GameAmerican Political Science Review, 1967
- The kernel of a cooperative gameNaval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1965
- 21. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative GamesPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1964
- n-Person games with only 1, n − 1, and n-person permissible coalitionsJournal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 1963