The North Korean Missiles: A Military Threat or a Survival Kit?

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Abstract
North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them, but has not been able to modernize its armed forces and its conventional warfare capability has deteriorated. Not simply a scheme to gain international aid and hard cash, the missile program has thus come to assume a strategic position for Pyongyang. This article outlines the history of the missile program, takes a look at missile capabilities, and discusses implications such as the threat perceived by Japan and the United States, sales to the Middle East and South Ask, and their value as a shield against outside pressure. Above all, they help ensure the survival of the Pyongyang regime. The article goes on to detail American policy responses including TMD, conventional deterrence including preemptive strikes (not appropriate for the Korean situation), the MTCR, and the negotiation track. For South Korea, the author suggests a combination of deterrence through enhanced missile capability of its own and continued engagement policy. North Korea is consistent with its pattern of flexing military muscle then demanding a price. So long as this keeps working, Pyongyang is unlikely to dismantle its missile program. The only possible trade-off might be the combination of US forces withdrawal and South Korea's gradual political submission—too high a price. North Korea thus will not relinquish its leverage—barring a major change domestically that could possibly call for a broader peace dividend, but that may not be possible without a genuine reconciliation based on peaceful coexistence.

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