Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs “Untouchables?”

This publication has 51 references indexed in Scilit:

• The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation
  Econometrica, 2004
• Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions
  International Review of Law and Economics, 2004
• Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods
  Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1999
• A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior
  The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997
• Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship
  The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997
• Casual police corruption and the economics of crime
  International Review of Law and Economics, 1997
• Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?
  The Economic Journal, 1995
• Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion
  The RAND Journal of Economics, 1995
• Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?
  The RAND Journal of Economics, 1991
• The Theory of Error in Centrally-Directed Economic Systems
  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1964