Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions
- 30 June 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 219-225
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2004.08.006
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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