ELECTORAL RULES AND ELECTORAL COORDINATION
- 1 June 1999
- journal article
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Political Science
- Vol. 2 (1) , 145-161
- https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.145
Abstract
▪ Abstract Electoral coordination occurs at two main levels: (a) within individual electoral districts, where competitors coordinate entry and citizens coordinate votes; and (b) across districts, as competitors from different districts ally to form regional or national parties. We know a fair amount about district-level electoral coordination for single-tier electoral systems. In particular, when political actors are primarily concerned with the current election and have good information about the relative chances of potential competitors, two different M + 1 rules apply in an M-seat district. First, the number of competitors entering a given race tends to be no more than M + 1; second, when more than M + 1 competitors do enter a race, votes tend to concentrate on at most M + 1 of them. We know much less about cross-district coordination, in which potentially separate local party systems merge to form a national party system. This essay focuses on the latter, relatively neglected topic.Keywords
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