The Accuracy of Game Theory Predictions for Political Behavior: Cumulative Voting in Illinois Revisited
- 1 November 1994
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 56 (4) , 885-900
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2132065
Abstract
This article is an empirical analysis of the predictive power of game theoretic concepts for political behavior. It compares the Nash equilibrium solutions to the trembling-hand perfect solutions. Appropriate data for such a test come from the decisions of the Democratic and Republican parties concerning the number of candidates to nominate for cumulative voting general elections in Illinois. Using an innovation in statistical methods which allows the comparison between point and set predictions, I find that game theory is a good predictor of actual political behavior and that the Nash solution is a superior predictor to the trembling-hand perfect rule.Keywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Comments on the Interpretation of Game TheoryEconometrica, 1991
- Credibility, Uncertainty, and DeterrenceAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1991
- The Presidential Surge and its Midterm Decline in Congressional Elections, 1868–1988The Journal of Politics, 1991
- Domestic Opposition and Foreign WarAmerican Political Science Review, 1990
- Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the MacroeconomyAmerican Political Science Review, 1989
- Persistent equilibria in strategic gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1984
- The Dynamics of Party IdentificationAmerican Political Science Review, 1983
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium conceptInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1978
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902–1954American Political Science Review, 1962