Environmental enforcement when ?inspectability? is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties
- 1 October 1994
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 4 (5) , 479-494
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00691924
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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