Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information
- 1 February 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 27 (1) , 99-127
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(91)90006-a
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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