Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
- 1 November 1997
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 112 (4) , 1163-1202
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555457
Abstract
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism forKeywords
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