Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets
- 1 October 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 38 (8) , 1527-1553
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90026-4
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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