A Cognitive Approach to International Negotiation*

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
When it comes to the study of international negotiation processes, game theory has certain shortcomings. It is basically static in nature; it tends to homogenize actors and ‘blackbox’ information processing; and it assumes unitary actors. This article suggests a cognitive approach to the study of international negotiation processes as one way to overcome these shortcomings. The suggested model regards information processing as the link between inter‐state negotiation and decision‐making within the state, and emphasizes the role of belief systems in shaping expectations and interpretations. Specifically, the negotiating actors’ images of the adversary, self‐images, and images of situation are singled out as suitable objects of study. Relevant insights and hypotheses concerning the relationship between different parts of the actors’ belief systems are identified.

This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit: