Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement and Long-Term versus Short-Term Contracts
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper develops a multiperiod agency model to study the use of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar mKeywords
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