Debt and warrants: Agency problems and mechanism design
- 30 September 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 2 (3) , 237-254
- https://doi.org/10.1016/1042-9573(92)90001-t
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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