Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms
Preprint
- 1 December 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of efficiency.Keywords
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