Rational Arguments and Irrational Audiences: Psychology, Planning, and Public Judgment

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Abstract
Institutions involved in technological issues like the use of nuclear power are confronting a phenomenon familiar to planners: hostile public audiences who read the facts differently from experts. In many situations, frustrated technocrats turn to behavioral decision science for advice about how to deal with “irrational” publics. But whether or not public judgment appears rational depends on which of several rival explanations of judgment bias one embraces. Those perspectives also show that, in the influence that institutions can have on public judgment of issues with uncertain consequences, the line between manipulating public judgment and emancipating it from biases and misperceptions is a fine one. Garnering public acceptance often involves a professional dilemma of choosing between the morally questionable shaping of public preferences and the surrendering of complex choices to public biases. Resolution of that dilemma requires creating new contexts for public judgment, a task that scientists, technology managers, and analysts are not disposed to pursue, but which the planning community may be well equipped to handle.

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