The Policy Basis of Government Coalitions: A Comparative Investigation
- 1 October 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 23 (4) , 499-519
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400006700
Abstract
This article examines a key assumption of many approaches to the analysis of government coalitions, that parties are exclusively concerned with the achievement of immediate policy objectives. We first consider the extent to which policy considerations can be used to characterize coalitions formed in eight postwar democracies, using party election programmes to operationalize and test a variety of policy-based models of government formation. We then see what parties get from governments in terms of declared policy commitments, both in and out of office. The conclusion in both cases is that party policy clearly influences the formation of coalitions, but its impact is substantially modified by long-term structures and cleavages within different party systems.Keywords
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