Capacity signals and entry deterrence
- 31 March 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 4 (1) , 25-42
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(86)90045-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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