What Should Rational Cognitive Misers Do?
- 1 December 1991
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 85 (4) , 1417-1420
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1963954
Abstract
In the June 1991 issue of this Review John Orbell and Robyn Dawes have argued that prisoner's dilemma games are shaped, in part, by “cognitive misers”—players who assume other players are like themselves. In such games, this results in more play and in a higher expected payoff by cooperators than by defectors, lain McLean agrees with the conclusions of Orbell and Dawes but takes issue with their reasons and their model. In turn, Orbell and Dawes retort, arguing that players in prisoner's dilemma games do not respond as McLean assumes they will.Keywords
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