A Theory of Compensation and Personnel Policy in Hierarchical Organizations with Application to the United States Military
- 1 July 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 523-562
- https://doi.org/10.1086/322072
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military Downsizing ProgramsAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- Estimating Dynamic Models of Quit Behavior: The Case of Military ReenlistmentJournal of Labor Economics, 1995
- Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?Journal of Labor Economics, 1993
- Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. TheoryThe Journal of Finance, 1988
- Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization DesignJournal of Political Economy, 1988
- Worker Heterogeneity, Job Screening, and Firm SizeJournal of Political Economy, 1985
- Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 1984
- Employer Size and WagesThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1982
- Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor ContractsJournal of Political Economy, 1981
- Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor MarketThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976