Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
- 1 November 1999
- proceedings article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 129-139
- https://doi.org/10.1145/336992.337028
Abstract
We suggest an architecture for executing protocols for auctionsand, more generally, mechanism design. Our goal isto preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants (sothat no nonessential information about them is divulged, evena posteriori) while maintaining communication and computationalefficiency. We achieve this goal by adding anotherparty - the auction issuer - that generates the programs forcomputing the auctions but does not take an active part inthe protocol. The auction ...Keywords
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