Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control
- 1 February 1998
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 53 (1) , 1-25
- https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.15240
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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