The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
- 1 February 1998
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 113 (1) , 187-225
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555568
Abstract
From the viewpoint of a company's controlling shareholder, the optimal ownership structure generally involves some measure of dispersion, to avoid exKeywords
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