Reputation and legislative leadership
- 1 September 1987
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 55 (1) , 81-119
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00156812
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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- Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of RepresentativesThe Journal of Politics, 1968
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