Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2001
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 116 (1) , 313-350
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556329
Abstract
We show that if firms statistically discriminate among young workers on the basis of easily observable characteristics such as education, then as firms learn about productivity, the coefficients on the easily observed variables should fall, and the coefficients on hard-to-observe correlates of productivity should rise. We find support for this proposition using NLSY79 data on education, the AFQT test, father's education, and wages for young men and their siblings. We find little evidence for statistical discrimination in wages on the basis of race. Our analysis has a wide range of applications in the labor market and elsewhere.Keywords
This publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
- Chapter 48 Race and gender in the labor marketHandbook of Labor Economics, 1999
- Employer Learning and the Signalling Value of EducationPublished by Springer Nature ,1998
- Understanding the Role of Cognitive Ability in Accounting for the Recent Rise in the Economic Return to EducationPublished by National Bureau of Economic Research ,1998
- Employer Learning and Statistical DiscriminationPublished by National Bureau of Economic Research ,1997
- Learning and Wage DynamicsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996
- Layoffs and LemonsJournal of Labor Economics, 1991
- Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle IncentivesJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1989
- A procedure for testing the signalling hypothesisJournal of Public Economics, 1981
- Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor MarketsILR Review, 1977
- The Economics of DiscriminationPublished by University of Chicago Press ,1971