Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- 1 March 1988
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 5 (1) , 31-44
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00435496
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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