MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*
- 1 March 1992
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 4 (1) , 1-30
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00052.x
Abstract
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This publication has 34 references indexed in Scilit:
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