An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- 1 June 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 54 (1) , 26-47
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90103-b
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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