On the failure to induce meager offers in ultimatum game
- 1 March 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 14 (1) , 17-32
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(93)90038-m
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- On the rebustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformationEconomics Letters, 1991
- Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargainingTheory and Decision, 1990
- Fairness and the Assumptions of EconomicsThe Journal of Business, 1986
- An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargainingJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1982
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining ModelEconometrica, 1982
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975