Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- 1 March 1991
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 1 (1) , 31-44
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01210572
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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