The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- 1 August 1985
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 36 (2) , 277-288
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross SubstitutesEconometrica, 1982
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley AlgorithmThe American Mathematical Monthly, 1981
- College Admissions and the Stability of MarriageThe American Mathematical Monthly, 1962