A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms
Open Access
- 30 September 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 88 (1) , 119-160
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2542
Abstract
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