Hostile Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Governance
Preprint
- 1 January 1997
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper uses clinical evidence to show how the German system of corporate control and governance is both more active and more hostile than has previously beeKeywords
All Related Versions
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