Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- 1 September 1986
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 15 (3) , 133-154
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769254
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential EquilibriumEconometrica, 1985
- Persistent equilibria in strategic gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1984
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of PerfectionEconometrica, 1984
- Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorEconometrica, 1984
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problemsJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1982
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium conceptInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1978
- The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution forn-person noncooperative gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategiesJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1974
- Non-Cooperative GamesAnnals of Mathematics, 1951