ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY

This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:

• The Probability of Being President
  The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1993
• Presidential Commitment and the Veto
  American Journal of Political Science, 1991
• Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939
  The Journal of Law and Economics, 1991
• Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990
• A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
  American Journal of Political Science, 1989
• Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium
  Public Choice, 1987
• Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and Congress
  Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1985
• When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation
  The Journal of Politics, 1983
• Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral College
  American Political Science Review, 1975
• The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning
  American Political Science Review, 1974