Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium
- 1 January 1987
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 52 (3) , 227-244
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00116706
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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