Understanding theChallengerDisaster: Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems
- 1 June 1993
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 87 (2) , 421-435
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2939051
Abstract
The destruction of the space shuttleChallengerwas a tremendous blow to American space policy. To what extent was this loss the result of organizational factors at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration? To discuss this question analytically, we need a theory of organizational reliability and agency behavior. Martin Landau's work on redundancy and administrative performance provides a good starting point for such an effort. Expanding on Landau's work, I formulate a more comprehensive theory of organizational reliability that incorporates both type I and type II errors. These principles are then applied in a study of NASA and its administrative behavior before and after theChallengeraccident.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Working in Practice But Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of “High-Reliability Organizations”Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1991
- On Multiorganizational Systems in Public AdministrationJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1991
- Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems.Administrative Science Quarterly, 1990
- Coordination Without HierarchyPublished by University of California Press ,1989
- There is more than One Way to be RedundantAdministration & Society, 1986
- Parallel SystemsPublished by University of California Press ,1985
- FEDERALISM. REDUNDANCY AND SYSTEM RELIABILITYPublius: The Journal of Federalism, 1973
- Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and OverlapPublic Administration Review, 1969